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ROUND TABLE

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

A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

SOVIET RUSSIA AT WAR

DURANTY · GOTTSCHALK · HARPER

384th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY • 172

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

SOVIET RUSSIA AT WAR

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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WALTER DURANTY, Foreign Correspondent, *New York Times*

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK, Professor of Modern History, University of Chicago

SAMUEL N. HARPER, Professor of Russian Language and Institutions, University of Chicago

* A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, June 29, 1941, at 1:30 P.M., Central Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

SOVIET RUSSIA AT WAR

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After a week of war between Germany and the Soviet Union few facts had emerged to cast helpful light upon the future outcome of the struggle. The strength of the Red army was a matter for speculation as it faced the practiced troops of Germany. Behind the Russian lines in Europe lies a nation whose republics stretch eastward to the Pacific Ocean and about which America knows little.

How will the people of the Soviet Union react to this war? How strong is the political leadership in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? Can the economic structure of this socialist state stand the strain of a major war? What lies behind the cloak of censorship which for years has shadowed one-sixth of the world?

To answer these and other questions the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *invited three expert observers to its microphone to discuss "Soviet Russia at War."*

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MR. GOTTSCHALK: Gentlemen, I think the ROUND TABLE is extremely fortunate in having two such experts as you as its guests. Harper, if I am not mistaken, you have studied Russian affairs since long before the Revolution.

MR. HARPER: Since 1904.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: And you have been there about twenty times since then.

MR. HARPER: To be precise, eighteen times.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Duranty, you have been in Russia for

twenty years. I know that I have been reading your dispatches from there for a great many years.

MR. DURANTY: I lived there for thirteen years straight and have spent three or four months there every year since.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is fine for the ROUND TABLE, because we want to talk about *facts* this afternoon. We don't want to argue about intervention or nonintervention or about any of the other moot questions of the day. We want simply to have a factual discussion on Russia. Russia is definitely at war at last, and we want to know, Duranty, whether you think there is any chance of Russia's maintaining her position for any length of time.

MR. DURANTY: I think one point is not fully realized by some of the military experts, and that is that Russia has not yet begun to fight within the area of its own fortifications.[1] The fighting so far has been in that area which Russia seized deliberately as a glacis or outwork, or sort of bastion area, and where the fighting will be decisive will be on the old frontiers of Russia which have been prepared for the last seven years at least.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Then it is a fact that there is some point in discussing Russia's situation, and it won't be ancient history before we get through. Do you think so, Harper?

MR. HARPER: No, I don't. I think it is too early to prognosticate on the military side, but I think it is very important that we discuss the internal setup.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Good! In any war situation the morale of the people fighting the war is a very important factor, and I should like to start with that problem. Do you think the morale of the Russians is good at this time?

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[1] *That is, within the area of the Soviet Union excluding the areas of land ceded by Finland in 1940 and those occupied in 1939 and 1940 —Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Russian segment of Poland, Bessarabia, and Bukovina.*

MR. HARPER: If we take it from the political point of view, I think we should note, first, that, while the promises of the new constitution given to the peoples of the Soviet Union in 1936 have not been carried out fully, nevertheless they have had elections.[2] I don't think they have been entirely as meaningless as a great many people thought. These elections are different from ours. On the basis of my long study of Russia from before the Revolution, I note that in these last years the Russian people and those in the Soviet Union have secured at last a channel of self-expression and self-assertion.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Would you go so far, Duranty, as to agree with Harper that that would seem to indicate a certain growth of democracy inside Russia?

MR. DURANTY: I think the mechanism of democracy has been set up, but I still believe there has been a good deal too much of formal democracy. That is to say, they have learned at least the mechanism of voting, but I think, so far as self-expression is concerned, there has been a great deal of instructing the voters. That has occurred in other countries, too; but the voter is so thoroughly instructed in Russia that they vote 100 per cent, with no dissenting voice heard. I myself would be more impressed if the majority had not been 100 per cent and even in some fantastic cases where counting is a little careless (as one hears it has been in this great country occasionally), 102 and 103 per cent.

MR. HARPER: And in the Soviet system we must note the special position that the party holds.[3] You were in Moscow at the time of the last and very important party conference in February of this year, were you not, Duranty?

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[2] *The new constitution was adopted in 1936, establishing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a "socialist state of workers and peasants," composed of eleven constituent Soviet republics. It contained provision for wide democratic rights, including that of the secret election ballot for the Soviet citizen.*

[3] *That is, the Communist party of about two million members.*

MR. DURANTY: Yes.

MR. HARPER: And the party still holds the leading position?

MR. DURANTY: The party holds the leading position, but I would wish you to understand, Gottschalk, and you, too, Harper, that the position of the party in the last six months, let us say, has been modified very considerably for the better.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In other words, I take it you are not quite agreed as to whether this constitutional experiment has promoted the morale of Russia or not. I would like to go on from that point and take up the question of economic morale. Has the productivity of the Russians tended toward a better military state in Russia?

MR. HARPER: There I would say very definitely, on the basis of my studies, that in the past year production has shown definite progress. Now, there has been recent legislation with regard to labor hours, imposing severe penalties for truancy and lateness. And there has been, if you wish, more regimentation. That is a very interesting question to raise, and it can't be answered.

MR. DURANTY: Wait a minute! There has been actually a definite conscription of labor with all that conscription implies in military terms. It is not so much a question of hours. Mind you, it is true that wages have increased in a commensurate degree, but there have been various penalties applied in the past year.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The point I would like to ask in that connection is not so much whether that makes for greater efficiency—I assume it does— . . . .

MR. DURANTY: It does.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: . . . . but whether it makes for a higher standard of living.

MR. DURANTY: Yes, I should say "Yes" again, undoubtedly. Labor has been paid overtime and possibly in some cases for a lot

of work—Russia works on piece time—salaries have been raised. But don't forget that the standard of living in Russia depends not on wages but on supply. If there are enough goods, the standards will improve: not because salaries are raised but because goods are available for the consumer.

MR. HARPER: But, from the point of view of political morale, how does this "conscription of labor" operate?

MR. DURANTY: In the Russian system now it is virtually true that the worker is as thoroughly tied to his job as is the soldier to his job, and he has to be there on time. If he is not, he suffers a severe penalty. I remember that not long after the system began a man came to me and said, "My brother is in trouble. He has been late three times and is liable to be imprisoned, if not killed." He was only late a half-hour three times, and on two of those times, at least, he had a good excuse.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: They did not put him up against a wall and shoot him?

MR. DURANTY: Of course not. I said, "You will see what will happen in this: they will see whether your brother is a good worker or is a loafer, and, if he is a loafer, they will get rid of him." And he was not shot or backed up against the wall, but he was docked for the time lost.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: But the laws are very definite. Harper, you are an expert on the laws of Russia. The laws very definitely do imply capital penalty for a great many offenses.

MR. HARPER: I think we take those laws too literally in many instances. They are not applied in practice.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is to say, they are actually more an indication of what they want to correct rather than what they are going to do.

MR. HARPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Now, you mentioned the question of supply as the determining factor in the standard of living in Russia, Duranty, and I wonder whether the manufacture of consumer goods has increased to any extent in the past year or more.

MR. DURANTY: It has increased perhaps in actual volume but not in a ratio to demand. The real trouble has been that the Russian demands for the army, because of the very immense menace they knew was coming, have been so great that they have not been able to create consumer goods.

On the other hand, the Russians had a record harvest last year—the biggest harvest they have ever had—and so the food supply is better, and that, after all, is the most essential thing. Then housing has improved undoubtedly in the great cities.

MR. HARPER: In regard to the crop of last year, just as you had one or two of these severe measures of discipline with respect to labor in industry, there must have been a tightening-up of the framework of collectivism of agriculture. Now, if the crop was good last year, these measures have not been resented, and people have worked under them.

MR. DURANTY: Yes, undoubtedly. Only there is this point: The peasants have considerable surplus money and nothing to spend it on, and even in Russia babies need shoes, and that is one of the criteria by which countries decide their happiness or lack of happiness.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In determining this question of prices and standard of living, not only supply and demand are necessary but, in talking about conditions in Soviet Russia at war, it seems to me very important that we talk about transportation. Duranty, you recently crossed the Siberian region, and I wonder if you had a chance to observe any of the transportation problems.

MR. DURANTY: Yes, and it was very interesting to me. I had heard that the Trans-Siberian Railroad had been double-tracked,

but this time I saw it. I saw not only double tracks but double bridges.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You mean they built two bridges every time they crossed a river?

MR. DURANTY: Yes, two separate bridges. If one is injured by bombing, the other one remains.

MR. HARPER: What about the supplementary track being built in the north that we heard so much about?

MR. DURANTY: I am not sure about that, although I have asked about it.

I had a rather interesting experience on my trip across the region of Siberia. I shared my coach three nights with a captain of the frontier guard, a young man, and there was a colonel in the same carriage. We had a good deal of talk together, and he gave me some very interesting information. First of all, I noticed that troops were moving westward, and I said, "I suppose they are going home for their Easter vacation." He said, "Not at all, we are moving troops steadily westward because we know that the enemy is there—the German enemy."

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The captain said that?

MR. DURANTY: Yes, and the colonel confirmed it. This was, I may say, before the neutrality pact with Japan[4] and long before the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia. And he said, what is more, "We can take care of the Japanese. Our frontier guards (he did not say, but which I imagine numbers about 350,000 men) and the local territorial division can handle the Japa-

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[4] *A neutrality pact was signed between Russia and Japan, April 13, 1941, guaranteeing each from attack in the rear should either be "the object of military activity on the part of one or several powers." The accord also guaranteed the territorial integrity of Japanese-dominated Manchukuo and Russia's Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia).*

nese. They won't make any trouble. We have taught them two lessons already."[5]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I don't want to interfere too much with the discussion of this problem of production and of industrial relations, but I think we ought to discuss the "purges" in connection with the internal morale of Russia.

Have the purges, as far as you have studied them, created a situation in Russia which is rather hopeless with regard to industry and military affairs?

MR. HARPER: Well, I spoke of the failure of the complete fulfilment of the constitution, and I had in mind the purges. They represented another trend—a very negative trend. Those purges in 1937–38 definitely overreached. Since 1938 . . . .

MR. GOTTSCHALK: By "overreached" you mean they got too many people?

MR. HARPER: They got out of hand.

MR. DURANTY: They got out of hand, and it was collective madness. The thing became crazy. They were denouncing one another, slandering one another—people were having competition in doing that. All this came out in their own newspapers.

MR. HARPER: There was official recognition of that fact?

MR. DURANTY: Yes, it recognized definitely that the madness had existed, and they gave most astounding and fantastic figures on how this madness existed.

MR. HARPER: And it was stopped on the basis of that?

MR. DURANTY: It was stopped suddenly by the action of Stalin in July, 1938.

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[5] *In frontier fighting in recent years between the Manchukuan and Mongolian puppet states referred to in n. 4 above and in the area southwest of Vladivostok at the junction of the Korean, Manchukuan, and Russian borders.*

MR. HARPER: Of course, it was not possible to repair the damage done?

MR. DURANTY: Not to repair all the damage, but great efforts have been made. They printed the figures for four major provinces where reinstatements were made. They cannot revise the cases of the dead, but the number of dead was not very great, and the reinstatement was over 50 per cent in the four major provinces.

MR. HARPER: I know in 1939 I noted very clearly one effect of the purge. When I went around the institutions, I found young men in positions of responsibility. There were a few of the old, but it was largely a new generation—the generation trained by the twenty-two years of revolution—that had come up to positions of responsibility. You probably found the same thing last winter. Would you be willing to give your impression of these new men, whom we call "Stalin boys" sometimes?

MR. DURANTY: Yes, I found that, and I am not denying that some of these boys are energetic, tough, and hard. But you can't tell me that you improve the organization of any concern, no matter what it is—civil, military, or reportorial, or anything else—by cutting the organization all to pieces and putting in a lot of good new men, however good they are. And that is what they did.

I went to places and asked for people I had known before, and they said they had never heard of them. I thought they were lying or afraid, but the truth was they had not heard of them because the whole organization had been disrupted. It created a condition in which production went way down and stayed down, or, if it did not go down, it did not go up according to the curve of various plans. Actually, it went down in various branches.

MR. HARPER: For the last three years?

MR. DURANTY: Not for the last three years but up until the middle of last year.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Military terror in the past—in the his-

An Economic Atlas

of the Western Section

of the

SOVIET UNION

On the following pages are detailed maps of the economic features of the western area of the Soviet Union. The data are taken from the *Great Soviet World Atlas** and provide the basis for an analysis of the economic assets sought by Germany and endangered by the *Reichswehr* and *Luftwaffe.* The reader who follows the battle front day by day will be able from these maps to determine the actual economic losses sustained if the German army succeeds in moving eastward through the shaded buffer areas across the 1939 borders of the U.S.S.R.

The student of economics will find here (published for the first time in America) measurable data on the economic activities of this region. Most of the statistical information is for the year 1935, since which time output has increased and new plants have been constructed. It should be noted, however, that few new plants have been erected in the area covered by this study because of the decentralization efforts of the Soviet planners. Other sources (see "Suggested Readings," page 27) provide information of the general distribution of resources and industries in the remainder of the Soviet Union.

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* *Bolshoi Sovietskii Atlas Mira* (Moscow, 1937).

SCALE: 1 INCH EQUALS 250 MILES

LOCATION OF HEAVY INDUSTRY



All heavy industries with more than 300,000 rubles (about $60,000) production in 1935 are shown on this map. Light industry not shown (textiles, leather, glass, etc.) is concentrated in the Moscow area.

METAL AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTION



A thousand miles east of Moscow and 1,500 miles northeast of Krivoi Rog is the great Ural storehouse of iron, coal, oil, chemicals, and nonferrous metals. On this map enterprises with less than 100,000 rubles production are not shown.

LOCATION OF FOOD INDUSTRIES



European Russia is heavily dependent upon Ukrainian agriculture, but increasing emphasis has been laid upon developing the food industries farther east. Volume of production is not indicated on this map and only industries of more than 300,000 rubles output are shown.

SOURCE AND VOLUME OF ELECTRIC POWER



Electricity is essential to industry and a first objective of bombing raids. Dneprostroi, largest power source of the southern industrial area (more than 500,000 kilowatts) is within range of German planes. Stations of less than 6,000 kilowatts power are not shown on this map.

LOCATION OF FUEL INDUSTRIES



All coal-producing areas in European Russia are shown on this map. Not shown are the rich Baku and Groznyi oil fields of the Caucasus, and the Ural, Guriev, and Karaganda coal fields. Peat, an important fuel, is found only in the European sections of Russia. Enterprises of less than 100,000 rubles production are not shown.

tory of the French Revolution—had a desirable effect upon the army. It has gotten rid of the untrustworthy generals and the generals without initiative and put young and trustworthy persons in their place. Would you say that was true of the Russian terror?

MR. DURANTY: Well, it may have been, especially in the early days. I think there is no doubt that some of the early generals who were punished in the early days did have, if not conspirative action, conspirative conversations with people who were recognized to be for Germany, and for that they were punished. But the thing went too far, and I am sure a number of people were eliminated—and eliminated beyond recall—who today would be useful to the Soviet Union.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Is it your impression that the army of Russia is not well led at the present moment?

MR. DURANTY: It is not my impression at all! I think it is undoubtedly led by good men and that, as you say, Harper, the younger men have come up and are possibly more energetic. I think they have a good, *excellent* strategy, but I think also they have lost men they would be glad to have back.

MR. HARPER: Also, in respect to the internal structure of the army, there have been in these last two years a reorganization and an introduction of a new form of discipline—a new form of leadership in the army. I am referring particularly to the elimination of that element which disturbed us outsiders a great deal—the political commissar sharing power with the military commander of a given unit.

MR. DURANTY: Now you come to a point of great importance: the division of power, the division of authority every soldier knows is ruinous to an army. That has been eliminated almost totally.

MR. HARPER: You mean since the Finnish war?

MR. DURANTY: Since the fighting in Japan, first of all. The

lesson of the fighting in Japan was confirmed fully by the Finnish war.[6]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You mean the political commissars have been wiped out, or they are simply reduced in status?

MR. DURANTY: No, not even "possibly reduced in status." Their status has been determined in accordance with military necessity, and they no longer have a divided authority. It is the same in civil life. The Communist and the Communist representative in the factory can no longer interfere. They must cooperate.

MR. HARPER: To build up political morale.

MR. DURANTY: Yes, and to give what advice they can. They cannot alter orders.

MR. HARPER: That principle—the single responsibility of authority—is really being applied at last. They talked of it for years.

MR. DURANTY: Yes. I think it is being applied.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I don't want to stop this discussion of the political effect of purges or other reforms inside Russia, but I do feel it is important that we go on to a discussion of the army, navy, and the air force of Russia in discussing this war situation. You, Duranty, as a famous *New York Times* correspondent, and you, Harper, as the University of Chicago expert on Russian affairs, are probably not military experts, and yet I think an opinion from you would be valuable. Do you think the Russian army is any good?

MR. HARPER: My work has primarily been in the political side, and I followed with special interest the work of these political

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[6] *December, 1939, to March, 1940, ending with the cession of certain Finnish territory around Lake Ladoga and in the north-central sections of Karelia to the Soviet, plus the leasing of other territories to Russia for the building of bases (such as that at Hango).*

commissars, now eliminated in a moment of crisis. On the morale side I felt that Russia had a strong and patriotic army, but, particularly on the internal military side, I think Duranty is more qualified to speak, although I have always been interested in the statements of many of my friends among military experts on the spot who have seen the army. They have said, "This Red army is a tough army."

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Do you agree with that?

MR. DURANTY: I dare say, and I am no military expert. I had a year at the French headquarters at the end of the last war. I was with the Lett army fighting the Reds, and I have seen fighting in other parts of the world, so I know something about the way soldiers act and react.

Now, as a matter of fact, the Red army is well disciplined. You see it on parade and you see it in its ordinary social life, in groups in the street, etc. In these big parades they handle difficult operations with success, and there is nothing more difficult to move than tanks and guns in a town.

Then take the military point of view. After all, in Finland they started out with no thought that they were going to have a war at all. They thought they were going to march in with banners, and some of them did march in with banners. They thought it was going to be easy. But, when they realized what they were up against, they marshaled their forces and drove through an extremely strong fortified line supported and held by an extremely gallant and powerful people.[7]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The thing that interests me about the military situation is that now the English are close to German industrial centers. The Germans planted their industrial centers so as to be far away from English airplanes, but now the English airplanes can fly across Germany and land in Russia, and Russian

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[7] *The so-called Mannerheim Line, protecting Viborg and southeastern Finland from any military operations from Leningrad.*

planes are very much closer to the German industrial areas to begin with.

But do the Russians have any planes that are worth counting on?

MR. DURANTY: Well, their planes are, I think, out of date to some extent. That is to say, they are based on models older than the latest German planes, but they have a lot of them. They were the first people to use parachute troops. They used parachute troops in large numbers in maneuvers in 1935. They were the first people to use heavy tanks. They are beginning to fight now in positions they have been preparing for seven years. I think it is far too early to say that the Russians are inevitably beaten.

MR. HARPER: You may also call attention to the fact that Russia does not have what we call a "Maginot line" and, therefore, probably has not the "Maginot psychology."

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That raises an interesting question. We have talked about production, purges, and army organization. I should like to raise the question of the Communist Internationale. Do you think this war will be fought as an international war rather than as a national war?

Harper, your political interest ought to lead you to an opinion on that.

MR. HARPER: It was interesting to note in Molotov's announcement of the war to the people of the Soviet Union last Monday that he emphasized that it was a "war for the fatherland." He used the phrase that was used in the war of 1812 at the time of the Napoleonic invasion. That is indicative of a definite rise of Russian nationalism, Russian patriotism, during these last years.[8]

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[8] *V. M. Molotov, who resigned May 6 as premier in favor of Josef Stalin, is vice-premier of the Soviet Union and commissar for foreign affairs. In his statement of June 22, the day of the German invasion, Molotov said: "This is not the first time that our people have had to deal with the attack of an arrogant foe. At the time of Napoleon's invasion of Russia our people's reply was war for the fatherland, and Napoleon suffered defeat and met his doom."*

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is, emphasizing the old Russian national effort and successes?

MR. DURANTY: Precisely. One of the points that has been presented in reproach of Stalin by foreign political opponents (his own socialistic opponents) has been that he has betrayed the Revolution and has played the nationalistic game. I prefer to use the phrase "patriotic game," because the whole cult has been one of defense of Russia, of their own fatherland. Winston Churchill said exactly that in his speech: "the common men fighting for freedom." And as far back as 1935 we saw the new films—*Peter the Great* and other Russian pictures—all inculcating the idea of patriotism and patriotic defense as against what you might call socialism.

MR. HARPER: Reacting to that, in 1934 I was already using the phrase "economic patriotism."

MR. GOTTSCHALK: But Duranty's point apparently is that this is not economic patriotism but sentimental patriotism.

MR. HARPER: They are emphasizing that in the new building they have accomplished.

MR. DURANTY: That is very true and also in the collective farms. Not all collective farms are successful, but a great many are, and they are proud of that and they are proud of their new "culture," because they have more schools than ever before, more doctors, more hospitals, more bridges, and more factories. Certainly, they are proud of that. It is quite true that it is pride of country, not a pride necessarily or primarily in socialism.

MR. HARPER: They always mention that it is a part of the building of socialism.

MR. DURANTY: Certainly.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Then I take it both of you gentlemen are agreed that this is a nationalist war and not an international war as far as Russia is concerned.

MR. DURANTY: Certainly!

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I should like to go from this to the question of the effect of this war upon Russia's neighbors and, to begin with, on Russian substates. What would be your attitude?

MR. HARPER: You mean by "substates" those states which in the course of the past year have been subjected to the Soviet regime?

MR. GOTTSCHALK: During the past year or more.

MR. HARPER: The Baltic States and Bessarabia. I think very definitely that this will be a test of the Soviet system. What has been the result of the Sovietization of the past year? We can't answer that, but I think it is a question we should keep in mind. I would put it even more specifically. Will the Latvian peasant welcome back the former leader Ulmanis if backed by a German division and will the Bessarabian peasant welcome back the Rumanian landlord under Antonescu?

MR. DURANTY: I have been to Latvia recently and I know it well. I have talked about it a great deal, and I have written an article on the subject. The rank and file say they would prefer independence first, and they do not particularly want the Russians. I would bet that they would prefer, or would have preferred if they had had a choice, a German regime to a Russian regime. But they want independence first.

MR. HARPER: But you would not say the same about Bessarabia!

MR. DURANTY: I would not say that of Bessarabia. Bessarabia is sort of a stepchild of Rumania. The Bessarabians don't want the Rumanian officials back. They don't want the Rumanian landlord back. Rumania, after all, has never been noted very much for its excellence of government, and it did not treat Bessarabia very well.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Recently?

MR. DURANTY: No, that has been going on for the last twenty

years. Since the occupation of Bessarabia they have exploited the country, and the Russians were welcomed in Bessarabia, but I don't think they were welcomed in Latvia or Estonia.

MR. HARPER: Would you put Sweden and Finland in the same category as the Baltic States?

MR. DURANTY: Finland and Sweden have been fighting against their fear of Russia for the last one hundred and fifty to two hundred years, and, when I was in Stockholm last—a year ago—I saw there the statue of Charles XII with his hand pointing eastward toward Russia.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Time is getting short, gentlemen, and, in discussing the relation of Russia with her neighbors and her friends and enemies, I should like to raise the question of American co-operation. What would you say as to America's position?

MR. HARPER: Well, of course, the most important point there is the promise of aid to the Soviet Union that was made officially at the moment it was attacked by Germany. I would like to say very definitely that I don't think that promise of aid means alliance. Those who spoke of the Hitler-Stalin alliance now speak of the Roosevelt-Stalin alliance. In both instances the word is not applicable. I think it is a question of parallel action for respective national defense.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You don't think, then, that Russia gave Germany the green light to start the war in 1939?

MR. HARPER: No, I don't. And I think it is particularly interesting to note that those who do tend constantly to repeat that statement are the very ones who support the thesis that Hitler's aim is world-domination. I have never been able to find that those two statements fitted in. It seems to me that they are in definite contradiction of each other.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You have been to Japan recently,

Duranty. What was the Japanese reaction to this declaration of war by Germany?

MR. DURANTY: I was there much before that. I left Japan six or seven weeks ago. But Matsuoka implied or would imply that they would wish to continue and, I think, to assist . . . .

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but there are only ten seconds left, and I should like to indicate how you gentlemen stand on this situation so far as I can interpret your stand. You two gentlemen contend that the internal morale of Russia is not so doubtful as many believe and that their military ability is still any man's guess. You at least, Duranty, think that they may yet surprise the military experts.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. Russia has been preparing the defenses of her "old frontier" against attack from the west for at least how many years? Page 3.
2. The new Soviet constitution has been in effect for what period? Page 4.
3. What two improvements have been made in the Trans-Siberian Railroad to speed transportation facilities to the East? Page 7.
4. It is estimated Russian frontier guards on duty in the Far East number how many men? Page 8.
5. Date the "purges" with relation to the German invasion of Russia. Page 9.
6. Before the reorganization of the Russian army, the commander of an army unit shared authority with what other officer? Page 17.
7. Give two examples of fighting engaged in by the Soviet forces which brought about the reorganization cited in question 6. Page 17.
8. The first large-scale use of parachute troops was found in Russian maneuvers how long ago? Page 20.
9. A "war for the fatherland" is what Premier Molotov called the present Russo-German conflict. To what previous invasion of Russia was the phrase also applied? Page 20.
10. List three areas occupied by the Soviet Union in the last year. Page 22.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 27.

*

1. Consider the internal strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union. How do you think the Soviet ability to resist German invasion will be affected by

   a) Transportation facilities?
   b) Popular morale?
   c) Memories of the 1937–38 "purges"?
   d) Industrial production?
   e) The reorganization of the Red army?

2. Outline the reasons you have read or heard discussed as to Germany's reasons for invading the Soviet. Which do you feel is the more sound?

3. What have you observed to be American reactions to the German invasion of Russia? How do you think this invasion may affect American foreign policy? The national defense program? The policy of "all-out" aid to Britain?

4. Summarize the foreign policy of the Soviet Union from the rise of Hitlerism in Germany (1933) to the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities (1941).

5. How would you assess the role of the Communist party in the Soviet state? Compare this role to that of the Nazi party in Germany and the Fascist party in Italy. What similarities do you find? What differences?

6. Discuss the statement that the idea of world-revolution in Russia has been superseded by a spirit of nationalism and patriotism. How is this likely to affect the propaganda activities of the Soviet Union in this war?

SUGGESTED READINGS

FISCHER, LOUIS, "Hitler Marches East," *Nation*, June 28, 1941. *Problems of the German-Soviet war analyzed in terms of domestic repercussions within the Soviet Union, and the effect of the conflict on Britain and America.*

FUQUA, MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN O., "Germany's Strategy in the Attack on Russia," *Newsweek*, June 30, 1941. *An analysis of comparative strategies and tactics in the German-Soviet conflict.*

"Guide to the Soviet-Nazi War," *New Masses*, July 1, 1941. *A special war issue devoted to a discussion of "how it happened, angles for Americans, the Red army, and background of Soviet foreign policy."*

"Hitler's Plan of Campaign," *New Republic*, June 30, 1941. *The military strategies involved in the war.*

MOORE, HARRIET, "The Soviets 'Keep Their Powder Dry,' " *American Review on the Soviet Union*, June, 1941. *A review of Soviet foreign policy in 1941 and of steps taken to preserve Soviet neutrality despite the presence of war on the eastern and western frontiers.*

"Soviet Industry," *Fortune*, July, 1941. *A detailed study of the productivity and distribution of industry in the Soviet Union, with charts and maps.*

WERNER, MAX, *Military Strength of the Powers.* New York: Modern Age Books, 1939. *A concise volume, written some months before the outbreak of the present war, containing valuable information on the armed forces of the Soviet Union—the air and tank potential of the Red army, its training, morale, and tactical doctrines—together with a section devoted to the conditions and possible results of war between Germany and the Soviets.*

"World Rocked by War's Turn in Hitler's Attack on Russia," *Newsweek*, June 30, 1941. *A general survey of the events leading to the outbreak of German-Soviet hostilities and the first days of the conflict, with some fact material on the Soviet Union.*

Students seeking additional material on social, political, and economic conditions in the Soviet Union should refer to the files of *Soviet Russia Today*, to the *American Review on the Soviet Union*, and to the publications of the U.S. Department of Commerce, "Russian Economic Notes" (now incorporated in the *Foreign Commerce Weekly*).

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"Censorship," *Fortune,* June, 1941.

"Civil Liberties," *New Republic,* February 17, 1941.

COMMAGER, H. S., "Civil Liberties in Time of Crisis," *Scholastic,* April 14, 1941.

FULLER, W. D., "Freedom for What?" *Vital Speeches,* May 15, 1941.

HEWELCKE, GEOFFREY, "Is Canada Still a Democracy?" *American Mercury,* March, 1941.

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